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UNITED STATES V. BALSYS: DENYING A
SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINAL THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
When James Madison introduced the Bill of Rights' at the
first meeting of the newly formed United States Congress,2 he
explained that the amendments were "intended to lmit and
qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant
of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act,
or to act only in a particular mode.' " Accordingly, the Fifth
Amendment4 ensures certain individual rights by restricting the
government's powers.5 Although the Fifth Amendment's Self-
1 U.S. CONsT. amends. I-Y
2 See Wayne R. Gross, Note, Erosion of the Fifth Amendment Through the Use of
Defense Counsel as Witness, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 928 n.6 (1988) (stating
"Madison... in accordance with the demands of the states which were otherwise
reluctant to ratify the Constitution, introduced the amendments to the Constitution
embodying the Bill of Rights as soon as the First Congress met") (citing C. WARREN,
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 82-83 (1925)).
3 Gross, supra note 2, at 928 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1789)); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111-12 (1970) (stating "[tihe Fram-
ers were well aware of the awesome investigative and prosecutorial powers of gov-
ernment and it was in order to limit those powers that they spelled out in detail in
the Constitution the procedure to be followed in criminal trials") (Black, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). For a general review of the history of the Bill of
Rights, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights:
James Madison and the Founders' Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal
and State Power, 26 AL. CRIlM. L. REV. 1261 (1989).
4 The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
r See Gross, supra note 2, at 929; see also Diego A. Rotsztain, Note, The Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Fear of Foreign Prosecution,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1959 (1996) (noting the Fifth Amendment has been inter-
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Incrimination Clause appears straightforward in stating "[n]o
person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself,"' the clause has confounded commentators
7
and courts' alike. Specifically, two circuit courts recently split on
the issue of whether the privilege9 is available to a witness in a
United States proceeding who fears his compelled testimony will
incriminate him in a foreign prosecution. ° In United States v.
preted "as a right against governmental overreaching").
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)
(stating the Fifth "Amendment not only protects the individual against being invol-
untarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privi-
leges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or
criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings").
7See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar and Ren~e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Prin-
ciples: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995) (concluding
"[tihe Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of
vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights").
8 For example, there has been disagreement within the Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit regarding whether the self-incrimination clause provides protec-
tion to a witness facing prosecution by a sovereign other than the one compelling the
testimony. Compare United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2224-30 (1998)
(reviewing the Supreme Court's precedent regarding the self-incrimination clause
and concluding the "same sovereign" analysis is correct), with id. at 2237-42 (Breyer
J., dissenting) (concluding the "same sovereign" rule had been abolished by the
Court's precedent); compare United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1457 (11th Cir.
1997) (supporting the same jurisdiction analysis), with id. at 1482 (Birch, J., dis-
senting) ("One can hardly believe that our Founders would have formulated a fun-
damental right which could be exercised on American soil under the American Con-
stitution and which could not be abridged by an American government but which
could be abridged for the benefit of a foreign government or monarch.") (quoting
Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 874 n.24 (E.D. Mich. 1991)).
9 Throughout this Comment, the term "privilege" will refer to the privilege
against self-incrimination.
'0 Compare United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding the
privilege is not available to a witness facing fear of foreign prosecution) with United
States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding the privilege is available to a
witness facing fear of foreign prosecution), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
The situation in Gecas is remarkably similar to that in Balsys. Like Balsys, Ge-
cas is a resident alien from Lithuania. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1422. Gecas was sub-
poenaed by the Office of Special Investigations regarding allegations that he
"persecutled] ... persons because of their race, religion, or political opinion during
World War II." Id. If the allegations were true, Gecas would be deportable under 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(D) (1994). See id. at 1422. Gecas invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination and refused to testify after he provided his name and current ad-
dress. See id. at 1423. An Eleventh Circuit panel originally reversed the district
court's decision and held the privilege was applicable to Gecas. See United States v.
Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995), affg in part and rev'd in part, 830 F.
Supp 1403 (N.D. Fla. 1993), vacated, 81 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc,
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Balsys," the United States Supreme Court resolved this ques-
tion. The Supreme Court held that a resident alien with a "real
and substantial" 2 fear of foreign prosecution could not invoke the
privilege, because it was "beyond the scope of the Self-
Incrimination Clause."13
Aloyzas Balsys is a resident alien who immigrated to the
United States in 1961.' On his visa application, Balsys reported
that he was a member of the Lithuanian army from 1934
through 1940 and that he had been "in hiding" in Lithuania from
1940 until 1944.'5 He swore that the information he provided
was true.16 The Office of Special Investigations (OSI)" suspected
that Balsys had been involved in Nazi persecution during World
War II,"8 which, if correct, would subject him to deportation. 9
120 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997). That decision was thereafter vacated. See Gecas, 120
F.3d 1419.
For a review of how the issue has divided the circuits and district courts, see
Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1227-35 (1998);
Daniel J. Lindsay, Comment, Tied Up by a "Gordian Knot" United States v. Gecas's
Rejection of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Cases of Foreign Prosecution,
82 MINN. L. REV. 1297, 1306-11 (1998); Jonas Packer, Recent Development, United
States v. Gecas: Eroding the Protection of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 651, 654-59 (1998).
" 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
12 Id. at 2221; see also infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (discussing
factual requirement of real and substantial fear, a previously established pre-
requisite to implication of the constitutional question of law resolved in Balsys).
13 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2221.
14 See id.
15 Id
16 See id. "Balsys's visa application stated... : ['I understand that any willfully
false or misleading statement or willful concealment of a material fact... may sub-
ject me to permanent exclusion from the United States and, if I am admitted to the
United States, may subject me to criminal prosecution and/or deportation. []" United
States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 591 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 119 F.3d 122
(2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
17 Placed within the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice,
OSI was created by Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti in 1979 to investigate
and, if necessary, deport suspected Nazi war criminals. See Order of the Attorney
General, No. 851-79, Sept. 4, 1979; infra note 106 (outlining OS's mandate).
:8 See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2221.
19 See id. Balsys would be deportable under the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(E)(i), and 1251(a)(4)(D). See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2221.
Section 1182 (a)(3)(E)(i) states:
Participation in Nazi persecutions[-]
Any alien who, during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending
on May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with-
1999]
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Balsys answered his subpoena and appeared at a deposition to
give testimony; he refused to answer any questions other than
providing his name and address." In response to OSI's questions
regarding his wartime activities2' Balsys claimed his answers
(I) the Nazi government of Germany,
(H) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the
Nazi government of Germany,
(I) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the
Nazi government of Germany, or
(v) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Ger-
many,
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion is
inadmissible.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(E)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
Section 1251 (a)(4)(D) states: "Any alien described in clause (i) or (ii) of section
1182(a)(3)(E) of this title is deportable." Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1251 (a)(4)(D) (1994) (current version at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 (a)(4)(D) (1994 & Supp.
1998)).
Balsys could also be deported for lying on his visa application under §§
1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and 1227(a)(1)(A). See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2221. Section 1182(a)(6)(
C)(i) states: "Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact,
seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documen-
tation, or admission into the United States ... is inadmissible." Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(c)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1998). Section 1227
(a)(1)(A) provides that aliens who were inadmissible at time of entry may be de-
ported. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(1)(A) (1994).
20 See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2221.
21 OS's questions to Balsys included the following-
Q: Where were you when the Soviets occupied Lithuania in June of 1940,
Mr. Balsys?
Q: Mr. Balsys, what did you do during the Soviet occupation of Lithuania?
Q: Mr. Balsys, where were you in June of 1941 when the Germans occupied
Lithuania?
Q: What did you do during the German occupation of Lithuania?
Q: When did you join the Villiaus Saugumas?
Q: Who is the commanding officer of the Villiaus Saugumas?
Q: While you served in the Saugumas, did you work in the Communist and
Jews section?
Q: Were you responsible for the arrest and imprisonment of Jews?
Q: While you served in the Villiaus Saugumas, did you work in the Polish
section?
Q: Were you responsible for the arrest and imprisonment of Poles?
Q: During the time that you served in the Villiaus Saugumas, did you work
in the investigations section?
Q: Did you turn prisoners over to the Special Detachment?
Q: At the time you applied to immigrate to the United States, why didn't
you tell the U.S. Vice Consul in Liverpool that you had served in the Villi-
aus Saugumas?
Q: Were you afraid if you told the truth you would not be allowed to immi-
[73:589
1999] UNITED STATES V. BALSYS 593
could incriminate him under Lithuanian, Israeli, and German
law and invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.' OSI petitioned the district court to enforce the
subpoena.' The district court found that Balsys in fact faced a
substantial fear of prosecution in Lithuania and Israel as a re-
sult of his testimony to the OSI,2' however, it granted OSI's peti-
tion and ordered Balsys to testify.' Balsys appealed to the Sec-
ond Circuit, which reversed the district court's order and held
that "the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
may be invoked by a witness who possesses a real and substan-
tial fear of foreign prosecution."26 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the issue.27
The majority in Balsys began by looking at the plain lan-
grate to the U.S.?
United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 592-93 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations
omitted). The Villiaus Saugumas, referred to in OSrs questions, is the Lithuanian
name for the Nazi-sponsored Lithuanian Security Police. According to OSI Director
Eli M. Rosenbaum, the group "played a key role in the annihilation of more than
50,000 Jews in Vilnius." News Release, Justice Department Moves to Revoke U.S.
Citizenship of Former Member of Nazi-Backed Lithuanian Security Police, Dep't of
Justice 96-582 (Dec. 10, 1996), available in 1996 WL 710513.
' See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2221.
23 See id. at 2221; Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 591.
24 See Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 595-96.
2See id. at 600. The court reasoned that allowing "Balsys to invoke the privi-
lege would unreasonably impinge on the government's ability to monitor and verify
immigration and visa applications." Id. at 599. The court viewed Balsys's claim as
an effort to "thwart" domestic law. Id. As a result it held "that the Fifth Amendment
privilege cannot be asserted by a witness who fears prosecution under the criminal
laws of a foreign sovereign." Id. at 600.
23 United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 140 (2d Cir. 1997). The court did "not
find a significant difference in the harm to governmental interests from granting the
privilege to those who fear foreign prosecutions, and to those who fear domestic
prosecution, because the reasons for allowing the privilege are similar in both
situations." 1d. See infra notes 86-95 (discussing policy reasons for allowing the
privilege).
2See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2222. Two months after the Second Circuit decided
Balsys, the Eleventh Circuit, on rehearing en banc, vacated a panel's earlier deci-
sion (in a case with facts very similar to Balsys) that the privilege was available to a
resident alien facing foreign prosecution. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419
(11th Cir. 1997); supra note 10 (regarding split between the Second and Eleventh
Circuits). The question had come to the Supreme Court once before in Zicarelli v.
New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972). It was unnecessary
for the Court to reach the issue, however, because it found the witness's fear of for-
eign prosecution was "remote and speculative." Id. at 478. See infra notes 121-27
(discussing what the witness must demonstrate before the issue will be addressed).
2Justice Souter wrote the opinion for the majority and was joined by Chief
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guage of the Self-Incrimination Clause and determined that the
question before the Court turned on whether the foreign prose-
cution Balsys feared fell within the ambit of the Fifth Amend-
ment's "any criminal case." 9 Balsys and his amici had argued
for a broad interpretation of "any" to include a criminal case in
Lithuania or Israel."° The majority, however, interpreted "any"
in the context of the other Fifth Amendment protections.3' The
majority noted that the privilege is surrounded by "guarantees of
grand jury proceedings, defense against double jeopardy, due
process, and compensation for property taking,"" all of which are
implicated only by action of the United States government." Ac-
cording to the majority, therefore, the privilege protects a wit-
ness who reasonably fears "prosecution by the government whose
power the Clause limits, but not otherwise."' From this contex-
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy. Justices Scalia
and Thomas only joined Parts I, II, and I of the opinion. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at
2221. Parts IV and V, which Justices Scalia and Thomas did not join, discuss the
policies of the privilege and the possibility of extending it to foreign prosecutions
when a witness can demonstrate "cooperative prosecution." Id. at 2236. Justice Ste-
vens concurred in a separate opinion, which emphasized that the privilege protects
witnesses facing prosecution in an "American tribunal." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Ginsburg dissented in a separate opinion, in which she wrote "the Fifth
Amendment privilege... prescribes a rule of conduct generally to be followed by our
Nation's officialdom." Id. at 2237 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer dissented
in a separate opinion, in which Justice Ginsburgjoined. Breyer's dissent will be dis-
cussed throughout this Comment. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2221.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2222. Earlier in its review,
the majority concluded that Balsys, as a resident alien, is a "person" for purposes of
the privilege. See id. "It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent
resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person
within the protection of the Fifth Amendment." Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 596 (1953). Balsys's status as a resident alien, therefore, was not pertinent
to the resolution of the issue before the Court. Similarly, there was no dispute that
OSI was seeking to "compel" Balsys's testimony. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2222.
so See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2222-23 (noting Balsys's distinction between the
narrow language in the Sixth Amendment and the broader language of the Fifth
Amendment). "According to its plain terms, the Self-Incrimination Clause bars the
government from compelling a person to be a witness against himself in 'any crimi-
nal case,' not merely-as the government would have it-in any domestic criminal
case." Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the New York
Council of Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3, United
States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998) (No. 97-873).
3' See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223 (noting the "cardinal rule to construe provisions
in context").32Id.
3See id.
34 Id. But see Amann, supra note 10, at 1243-44 (noting that the Supreme Court
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tual reading, the Court found support for a "same-sovereign" in-
terpretation of the privilege.' Thus, the privilege would be ap-
plicable only when the same government compelling testimony
also threatened prosecution.
The majority proceeded by undertaking a comprehensive
review of Supreme Court precedent regarding the privilege. 6
The Court analogized the issue at hand to the early distinction
between federal and state courts and concluded that the holding
in United States v. Murdock3 7-"that one under examination in a
federal tribunal could not refuse to answer on account of prob-
able incrimination under state law"3 -- offered the proper view.
As further support for this conclusion, the majority offered an al-
ternative rationale for Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor,9 which the dissent relied on to reject a same sov-
ereign rule. The Court in Murphy stated "the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness
against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a
federal witness against incrimination under state as well as fed-
eral law."0 According to the Balsys dissent, this statement pre-
in United States v. Gonzales, 117 S. Ct. 1032, 1035 (1997), "gave the term 'any' in a
statute its broad literal meaning" and suggesting that the Court should do the same
when it decides the Balsys case).
"See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223. "e currently received understanding of the
Bill of Rights... was expressed early on [by] Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for
the Court[:] ... the Constitution's 'limitations on power... are naturally, and, we
think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the instrument.' " Id. at
2223-24 (quoting Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247
(1833)).
2" See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2224-30. For commentators' reviews of the prece-
dent, see Amann, supra note 10, at 1206-16; Rotsztain, supra note 5, at 1944-50.
37 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
"Id. at 396.
:3 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (holding "the privilege against self-incrimination pro-
tects a state witness against federal prosecution").
40 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77-78. "[Tihe Murphy opinion sensibly recognized that if
a witness could not assert the privilege in such circumstances, the witness could be
'whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even though
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to each.' " Balsys,
118 S. Ct. at 2227 (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55). The whipsawing is possible be-
cause the government is given the option of offering the witness prosecutorial im-
munity in exchange for a waiver of the privilege. See Balsys 118 S. Ct. at 2227. In
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), decided the same day as Murphy, the Court
applied the Fourteenth Amendments due process requirement to the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege, so that the states and the federal government were equally bound
by the privilege. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 3. After Malloy, it would be improper to al-
1999]
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cluded one government from forcing testimony that would lead to
prosecution by another.41 The majority, however, argued the
proper rationale for Murphy was the same theory on which Mur-
dock rested---"the principle that the courts of a government from
which a witness may reasonably fear prosecution may not in
fairness compel the witness to furnish testimonial evidence that
may be used to prove his guilt. 2 Essentially, according to the
majority, Murphy was based "on the understanding that the
state and federal jurisdictions were as one. ' This characteriza-
tion of Murphy precluded the dissent's argument that Murphy
had abolished the "same sovereign" rule."
The majority reviewed the policies of the privilege as ex-
plained in Murphy" and acknowledged that some might be
"broad enough to encompass foreign prosecutions and accord-
ingly... support a more expansive theory of the privilege than
the Murdock understanding would allow." Further, the major-
ity conceded that the principles enunciated in Murphy supported
the argument that extending the privilege to Balsys's situation
would serve "the purpose of preventing government overreach-
ing, which on anyone's view lies at the core of the Clause's pur-
low a federal prosecutor to grant a witness immunity that would not be broad
enough to encompass possible state prosecution as well, or vice versa. See Balsys,
118 S. Ct. at 2227. Murphy prevented this "whipsawing," therefore, by holding a
"state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in
any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against
him." Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79.
41 See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2237-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 2227-28.
43 Id. at 2228; see also id. at 2230 (asserting that the Murphy rationale, which
was based on its interpretation of English common law and discarded by the Balsys
majority, had previously been proven "fatally flawed").
4Id. at 2238 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "It is often reasonable for a federal wit-
ness to fear state prosecution, and vice versa. Indeed, where testimony may in-
criminate and immunity has not been granted, it is so reasonable, that one can say,
as a matter of law, that the privilege applies, across jurisdictions. . . ." Id
See id. at 2231-34; see also Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
41 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2231. After acknowledging the possibility of an expanded
privilege, the court summarily rejected it. ("The adoption of... such... theory
would, however, necessarily rest on Murphy's reading of pre-constitutional common-
law cases as support for.., the expansive view of the Framer's intent, which we and
the commentators since Murphy have found to be unsupported."); id see also id at
2230 n.l1 (outlining courts' and commentators' questioning of the English common
law as understood in Murphy).
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poses." 7 Moreover, in dicta, the Court gave credence to the the-
ory of" 'cooperative internationalism,' "8 which the Second Cir-
cuit and the dissent propounded and analogized to the " ' coop-
erative federalism' "relied on by Murphy.49 In the final analysis,
however, the majority concluded that neither Murphy" nor the
reality of Balsys's situation5' would support the extension of the
privilege based on the theory of cooperative internationalism.
Lastly, the majority noted that if the scope of the privilege was
widened to encompass Balsys's claim, the resulting burden on
domestic law enforcement efforts would be too great.52
The dissent" argued that, under Supreme Court precedent
and the recognized principles supporting the privilege, the Self-
Incrimination Clause must encompass prosecution by a foreign
tribunal when fear of such prosecution is substantial.' The dis-
sent relied on the fact that the Court's precedent55 demonstrated
that the "the words 'any criminal case' [do not] limit application
of the Clause to only federal criminal cases." 6 Indeed, the dis-
47 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2233.
48Id at 2234-35 (discussing the possibility of two countries working so closely
together in law enforcement that the fear of foreign prosecution becomes
"tantamount to fear of a criminal case brought by the Government itself); see also
infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text (discussing international cooperation in
fighting crime).
"9 See id. at 2234; see also id. at 2243 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Indeed the anal-
ogy to Murphy's observation about 'cooperative federalism,' in which state and fed-
eral governments wage a 'united front against many types of criminal activity,' is a
powerful one. That is because, in the 30 years since Murphy, the United States has
dramatically increased its level of cooperation with foreign governments to combat
crime.") (citations omitted); United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1997)
(describing increased collaboration in international law enforcement).
ro See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2233 (noting "Balsys invests Murphy's 'cooperative
federalism' with a significance unsupported by that opinion").
", See id. at 2236 (stating osrs mandate and cooperative agreements requiring
the United States to share evidence extracted from Balsys with Lithuania and Israel
does not rise to the level of "cooperative prosecution").
'2 See id. at 2235.
" The dissent this Comment discusses is the one filed by Justice Breyer and
joined by Justice Ginsburg. See id. at 2237; see also supra note 28.
See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2237 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Like the majority, the dissent primarily discussed Murdock and Murphy and
their competing interpretations of the applicability of the privilege. See id. at 2237-
42 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The major disagreement between Murdock and Murphy
is whether or not the English common law and early American cases embodied the
"same sovereign" rule. See id. at 2239-40.
Id at 2237 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of
N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964)).
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sent argued, the Court's decision in Murphy compelled a conclu-
sion that "any criminal case""7 must include situations where
"compelled testimony [could be used] in any... cross-
jurisdictional circumstance.""8 Moreover, the dissent forcefully
defended its interpretation of Murphy59 -the rejection of the
same sovereign rule-and challenged the majority's reading of
Murphy."0 Further, the dissent argued that Murphy's rule had
not been rendered unworkable,61 nor had the "related principles
of law.., changed so much 'as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.' "62
The dissent also relied on the purposes of the privilege to
solidify its belief that the privilege must be extended to include
compelled foreign incrimination.' The privilege "recognizes the
unseemliness.., created when a person must convict himself
out of his own mouth;"' protects personal privacy "by discourag-
ing prosecution for crimes of thought;"' reflects a fear of and de-
sire to defend against "governmental 'overreaching;' "6" and pre-
57 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2238 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59 See id. at 2238-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (outlining six reasons why the dis-
sent's rationale is correct). First, according to the dissent, "Murphy holds that the
'constitutional privilege' itself, not that privilege together with principles of federal-
ism, 'protects... a federal witness against incrimination under state.., law.' "Id.
at 2238 (omissions in original). Second, Murphy rejected Murdock because it did not
correctly interpret common law history. See id. at 2239; see also id. at 2241 (noting
that the majority's challenge of Murphy's historical interpretation of English com-
mon law does not demonstrate where Murphy was wrong and that "[alt worst, Mur-
phy represents one possible reading of a history that is itself unclear"). Third, the
Murphy opinion demonstrated that the privilege protected witnesses "from com-
pelled testimony in the face of a realistic threat of prosecution by any sovereign." Id.
at 2239. Fourth, the Murphy Court's catalogue of the privilege's purposes lead to the
same understanding. See id. Next, Murphy rejected as incomplete the commenta-
tors' arguments for the" 'same sovereign' " rule. Id. Finally, nothing in the Murphy
opinion, according to the Balsys dissent, could lead one to the conclusion that its
rule is "prophylactic." Id.
60 See id. at 2238 (asking what basis the majority had for its chosen rationale);
id. at 2240 ("Where is Murphy's error?"); id. ("Again, where is Murphy's error?").
61 See id. at 2241 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992)).
"Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2241 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 173-74 (1989)).
'4See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2242.
64id.
SId.
"Id. at 2243.
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serves the " 'preference for an accusatorial rather than an in-
quisitorial system of criminal justice.' " According to the dis-
sent, all of these purposes would be well served by allowing the
privilege to be utilized by a witness fearing foreign prosecution.6
The dissent was particularly compelled by the prevention of
governmental overreaching69 because of the United States' role in
the possible foreign prosecution of Balsys. ° After considering
the mandate of the OS17' and the United States' specific agree-
ment with Lithuania to cooperate in the prosecution of war
criminals,72 the dissent found "that the possibility of governmen-
tal abuses in cases like this one-where the United States has
an admittedly keen interest in the later, foreign prosecution-is
not totally speculative."
73
The dissent concluded its argument by rejecting two policy
arguments for not extending the privilege. 4 The first concern,
"that prosecution by a different sovereign seems not quite as un-
fair as prosecution by the same sovereign,"7" was dismissed by
67 Id. (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Com'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964)).
6 See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2244 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6 See id. at 2243 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("This concern with governmental
'overreaching' would appear implicated as much when the foreseen prosecution is by
another country as when it is by another domestic jurisdiction.... That is be-
cause ... the United States has dramatically increased its level of cooperation with
foreign governments to combat crime.").
See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). See infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text
(discussing OSI's stake in Balsys's prosecution).
7' See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2243; infra note 106 (outlining OSI's mandate).
72 See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2243; infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text
(describing the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and
Lithuania).
7 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2243 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993)). Demjanjuk, an alleged Nazi war criminal,
petitioned for habeas corpus relief. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed the district
court's denial of his petition. After an Israeli court acquitted him of his alleged
crimes, however, the Sixth Circuit reopened the case and granted the relief. The
court found that OSI attorneys had acted in "reckless disregard for the truth" in
withholding or ignoring unfavorable evidence. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 354; see also
Peter Worthington, U.S.-Style 'Justice' Not Wanted Here, TORONTO SUN, Dec. 19,
1997, at 15 (asserting "OSs prosecution of... DemJanjuk was more like persecu-
tion - as horrendous an example of abuse of process and justice as can be found in
any democracy").
74 See Balsys, 118 S. Ci at 2244-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 2244.
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the dissent because the issue of fairness is only one of "degree."7 8
Additionally, advances in international travel and communica-
tions capabilities make cooperation among countries now as
prevalent as cooperation between federal and state governments
and among the states had been at the time Murphy abrogated
the same sovereign rule. The second concern, that application
of the privilege to Balsys's situation would hamper domestic law
enforcement efforts, was similarly dismissed.7 8 Finding this con-
cern "overstated, 9 the dissent answered it in three steps. First,
the privilege would be applicable to foreign prosecutions only
when the witness could demonstrate a real and substantial
threat of such prosecution.0 Moreover, domestic law enforce-
ment officials would be deprived of evidence concerning only the
foreign crime as "the witness would not be entitled to claim a
general silence."81 In reality, the dissent argued, "the Govern-
ment would lose little information."82 Finally, where the evi-
dence protected by the "foreign application" of the privilege was
absolutely necessary, the dissent proposed the possibility of im-
munity whereby the government would make the possibility of
foreign prosecution unlikely.' Thereby dismissing the concerns,
the dissent concluded they "should not stand in the way of con-
stitutional principle[s].""
Considering the majority's reliance on the "same sovereign"
rule, its conclusion proscribing application of the Self-
Incrimination Clause based on a witness's fear of foreign prose-
cution is entirely rational. Still, the majority acknowledged the
significant role of international cooperation in law enforcement,
76 Id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 Id.
s See id.; see also United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 1997)
(pointing out that very few witnesses can demonstrate the required fear).
8' Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2245 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent added that in a
civil proceeding, such as the deportation proceeding in Balsys's situation, the gov-
ernment could argue that a negative inference should be drawn from the witness's
silence. See id.
82 mi
82 See id? (Breyer, J., dissenting). "At worst, granting de facto 'Immunity' in this
type of case would mean more potentially deportable criminal aliens will remain in
the United States, just as today's immunity means more potentially imprisonable
citizens remain at liberty." Id.8 Id.
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thereby giving credence to the dissent's proposal that the privi-
lege should be extended to prevent government overreaching
when the United States has a significant stake in the foreign
prosecution. While providing a polite nod to "cooperative inter-
nationalism," the majority failed to adequately evaluate and ac-
count for the United States' unique interest in foreign prosecu-
tion of Balsys.
This Comment suggests that the dissent's analysis of the is-
sue-analogizing international cooperation to cooperation be-
tween the separate federal and state governments-properly ac-
counts for the fact that government overreaching could be
prevented only by recognizing that the United States' interest in
seeing Balsys prosecuted rose to the level of "cooperative prose-
cution."" This Comment reviews the policies of the privilege, the
current collaboration with international law enforcement by the
United States, and the suggestion that domestic law enforcement
will not be unjustly hampered in the infrequent situations in
which the question arises. This discussion demonstrates that a
case-by-case analysis for extending the Self-Incrimination Clause
to include foreign application is the proper approach.
I. PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
"By the early sixteenth century, the courts and Church of
England had devised a latin phrase, 'Nemo tenetur prodere se ip-
sum,' or, in English, No one should be required to accuse him-
self."' Incorporation of this principle into the Constitution has
been called "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to
make himself civilized.""7 Although there is little legislative his-
tory on the Self-Incrimination Clause,8 courts89 and commenta-
Id. at 2236.
Scott Michael Solkoff, Judicial Use Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1441, 1444
n.16 (1993) (citing ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT TODAY 2 (1955)).
87GRISWOLD, supra note 86, at 7; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
457-58 (1966) (stating "one of our Nation's most cherished principles [is] that the
individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself').
'' See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223 n.5 (noting lack of legislative history); see also
United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1997) (The origins and history of
the Fifth Amendment are complex and controversial.").
See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1435-57 (11th Cir. 1997)
(providing an extensive historical review of the privilege); Williams v. Florida, 399
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tors9° have attempted to shed light on its controversial purpose
and origins. The historical purpose may be called into question,
but both the majority and dissent in Balsys relied on the same
catalogue of policies behind the privilege presented by the Mur-
phy Court. 1 The Court in Murphy stated:
The privilege against self-incrimination... reflects many of
our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwill-
ingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an ac-
cusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited
by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which
dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the gov-
ernment to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its con-
test with the individual to shoulder the entire load; our respect
for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of
each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a pri-
U.S. 78, 112 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The privi-
lege provides the accused the "absolute, unqualified right to compel the state to in-
vestigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts. The defendant
has a fundamental right to remain silent, in effect challenging the State at every
point to: 'Prove it!' " Id. For the Murphy Court's description of the policies behind
the Vrivilege see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
See generally Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1086 (1994).
Moglen suggests the privilege was not final approval "of a long-accepted
Tundamental right,' [rather it was a reflection] of the contentious prerevolutionary
constitutional debate, in which North American advocates made sweeping and often
antiquarian legal claims protecting or expanding their power to resist Imperial con-
trol." Id. at 1087; see also Solkoff, supra note 86, at 1444-48 (tracing the history of
the Fifth Amendment privilege from the English Star Chamber to its constitution-
alization).
To encapsulate, the privilege against self-incrimination protects us from a
recurrence of Star Chamber inquisition; from subjecting ourselves to a
Hobson's choice of peijury, contempt, or self-incrimination; from the excess
of State power; from invasions upon our solitude and right to be let alone;
and from an inherent distrust for self-deprecatory statements.
Id. at 1448 (citations omitted); see also Brett Alan Fausett, Note, Expanding the
Self-Incrimination Clause to Persons in Fear of Foreign Prosecution, 20 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 699, 701-02 (1987) (explaining there are two theories behind the
purpose of the privilege-a systematically-based theory and an individual rights-
based theory-and suggesting the Framer's intent was to systematically prevent
government persecution). For a historical survey of the privilege, see id. at 702-03.
9' See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2231-33; id. at 2242-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (both
discussing Murphy's catalog of policies).
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vate life, our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our
realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the
guilty, is often a protection to the innocent.9 2
The list reflects two related general principles-
safeguarding individual freedoms and preventing governmental
abuse.93 The courts hearing Balsys's case found the second pur-
pose provided more support to his claim.9 In sum, it seems ap-
parent that the purpose of protecting a witness from government
overreaching is a policy on which everyone can agree.95
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)
(internal citations omitted).
0 See Amann, supra note 10, at 1221. For a compelling argument about the ap-
propriateness of the personal autonomy purpose, in a case with facts and circum-
stances very similar to Balsys, see Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1483 (Birch, J., dissenting).
Government prosecutors seek potentially incriminating evidence from a
thirty-year resident alien who is suspected of war crimes perpetrated by
the Nazi regime during World War 11. The atrocities to which they would
link him epitomize the depths to which humankind can descend and ex-
emplify an absolute denial of human dignity. Yet, if the lessons from that
tragic episode in history are to teach us anything it must be that the sanc-
tity of the individual citizen must be cherished and protected relative to
the power of his government-even the majority in a democratic society.
... Unless we are blind and deaf to the legacy of the holocaust, we must
understand that the Fifth Amendments prohibition against the govern-
ment's intrusion into the inner sanctum of the individual citizen is no mere
'prophylactic rule'.... Rather, it is a right that acknowledges and ordains
the sanctity of the individual, insures his dignity and reaffirms the Ameri-
can concept of a government of laws, where the government is subservient
to the governed.
See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2233 ("Murphy's policy catalog would provide sup-
port.., for Balsys's argument that application of the privilege in situations like his
would promote the purpose of preventing government overreaching .... "); see also
Balsys, 119 F.3d at 129 (noting that the three categories of purposes of the privilege
include advancing individual integrity and privacy, protecting individuals against a
state's pursuit of its goals through excessive means, and promoting systematic val-
ues in our criminal justice system); United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 599
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that a "fundamental purpose of the privilege is to pro-
tect individuals against governmental overreaching"). The courts recognized the
first purpose-that of protecting an individual's autonomy-but were split on its
applicability to Balsys's claim. Compare Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2232 (stating "what we
find in practice is not the protection of personal testimonial inviolability"), with id-
at 2242 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the privilege's protection of personal pri-
vacy) and Balsys, 119 F.3d at 130 (arguing "[p]ermitting a witness to invoke the
Fifth Amendment to avoid incriminating himself in a foreign criminal case works to
protect the dignity and privacy of the individual").
"r See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2233 (stating that preventing government overreach-
ing is "at the core" of the privilege in "anyone's view"); see also, Rotsztain, supra
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II. "COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONALISM:" AN EXAMPLE OF
GOVERNMENTAL OVERREACHING
Once it is established that the privilege against self-
incrimination protects against governmental abuse, the question
becomes: What constitutes such abuse? The Self-Incrimination
Clause provides that "[n]o person shall be... compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."' Thus, Balsys
would be entitled to invoke the privilege if the testimony he was
being asked to give OSI would be used against him in "any
criminal case" brought by the federal or a state government.9
The majority acknowledged that a certain level of cooperation
between the United States and a foreign sovereign in a foreign
prosecution could entitle the witness fearing such prosecution to
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. 8 It conceded that "an ar-
gument could be made that the Fifth Amendment should ap-
ply... [if] the division of labor between evidence-gatherer and
prosecutor made one nation the agent of the other, rendering
fear of foreign prosecution tantamount to fear of a criminal case
brought by the Government itself."99
The Court in Murphy had defined "cooperative federalism"
as the "Federal and State Governments... waging a united
front against many types of criminal activity.""' Indeed, "the
Court suggested that the purpose of avoiding governmental
abuse was best served by preventing states and the federal gov-
ernment from compelling testimony that might incriminate the
witness in a court of another jurisdiction."1 ' Just as federal and
note 5, at 1942-43 (asserting that the privilege should not extend to foreign prose-
cution but acknowledging the protection the privilege provides against governmen-
tal abuse).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2222 (stating if "Balsys could demonstrate that any tes-
timony he might give in the deportation investigation could be used in a criminal
proceeding against him brought by the Government of either the United States or
one of the States, he would be entitled to invoke the privilege"). There was no ques-
tion that OSI was seeking to "'compel' "Balsys's testimony. Id.
98 See id. at 2235 ("This is not to say that cooperative conduct between the
United States and foreign nations could not develop to a point at which a claim
could be made for recognizing fear of foreign prosecution under the Self-
Incrimination Clause as traditionally understood.").
" Id. at 2235.
"0 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1964).
'01 United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Murphy,
378 U.S. at 56.
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state governments cooperate,"° so too are the United States and
foreign countries collaborating to fight international crime.'0 3 In
urging that the privilege against self-incrimination be extended
to apply to foreign criminal cases, the dissent analogized this
"cooperative internationalism" to Murphy's "cooperative federal-
ism."'
Although the majority believed that "cooperative federalism"
alone did not decide the Murphy case,0 5 the issue of "cooperative
internationalism" should have decided Balsys. OSI was created
specifically to detect, investigate, and take legal action against
alleged Nazi war criminals residing in the United States.'06 In
'*2 For a discussion of modern global, federal, and state cooperation, see Alfred
C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizating State: A Future-Oriented Prospective on the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769
(1998).
"' See New MLAT Treaties Increase DOJ's Reach, DOJ ALERT, Apr. 18, 1994
(noting "success in... high-priority campaign by the Justice and State Depart-
ments... to sign legal treaties with foreign nations compelling the mutual produc-
tion of criminal evidence"); ETHAN A. NADEIALANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (1993) (describing
cooperation between United States and foreign law enforcement agencies); Amann
supra note 10, at 1261-72 (reviewing various mechanisms of international law en-
forcement collaboration and noting the United States is "spearhead[ing] informal
global cooperation"); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy Considerations on Inter-State Co-
operation in Criminal Matters, 4 PACE Y.B. INT!L L. 123, 130 (1992) (discussing in-
creased cooperation among national and international police agencies); Bruce Za-
garis, International Criminal and Enforcement Cooperation in the Americas in the
Wake of Integration, 3 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 1 (1996) (describing enforcement
mechanisms).
104 United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218,2243 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105 See Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2233.
1 Order of the Atty. Gen. 851-79 (Sept. 4, 1979).
The Office of Special Investigations shall:
Review pending and new allegations that individuals, who prior to and
during World War H, under the supervision or in association with the Nazi
government of Germany, its allies, and other affiliated governments, or-
dered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person because of race, religion, national origin or political opinion; Inves-
tigate as appropriate, each allegation to determine whether there is suffi-
cient evidence to file a complaint to revoke citizenship, support a show
cause order to deport, or seek an indictment or any other judicial process
against any such individuals; Maintain liaison with foreign prosecution, in-
vestigation and intelligence offices; Use appropriate Government agency
resources and personnel for investigations, guidance, information and
analysis; and Direct and coordinate the investigation, prosecution, and any
other legal actions instituted in these cases with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United
States Attorneys Offices, and other relevant Federal agencies.
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its nineteen-year history, OSI has investigated over 300 alleged
war criminals and deported 48 such persons.1 7 It is mandated
by law to receive' and share0 9 evidence with foreign countries in
fulfillment of its mission. In fact, OSI's history of disclosing in-
formation to other interested countries led the district court to
conclude that Balsys faced a substantial threat of foreign prose-
cution."0  Specifically, the Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween the United States Department of Justice and the Office of
the Procurator General of the Republic of Lithuania Concerning
Cooperation in the Pursuit of War Criminals"' states:
[Tihe United States... agree[s] to provide... legal assistance
concerning the prosecution of persons suspected of having
committed war crimes in World War II in Lithuania and who
are now residents of the United States-to facilitate the inter-
view of witnesses, the conduct of other necessary activities, the
collection of documentary materials and other information rele-
vant to these investigations.1
2
Further, both Lithuania and Israel, the two countries in which
the district court found Balsys faced a substantial threat of
prosecution, have explicit laws criminalizing war crimes and
genocide activities." Balsys could have incriminated himself
Id. at 3-4.
107 See U.S. Orders Expulsion of Former Nazi Prison Officer, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Nov. 4, 1998.
'08 See Kathleen Kenna, U.S. Nazi-Hunters Relentless, No Lead is Too Slim to be
Followed up by Office of Special Investigations, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 2, 1997, at A13
(reporting "Germany... allowed OSI access to a list of 3,300 SS soldiers and their
dependents living in the United States").
'0 United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 595-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting
"OSI has entered into an agreement to provide evidence that it has gathered on
suspected Nazi collaborators to Lithuania" and it had "shared with Israel incrimi-
nating evidence that it gathered on suspected Nazi collaborator Ivan Demjanjuk).
See id. at 593-97 (applying relevant factors to determine if Balsys's fear of
foreign prosecution was "real and substantial"); infra notes 121-26 and accompany-
ing text (discussing real and substantial fear requirement).
. Signed Aug. 3, 1992, U.S.-Lithuania [hereinafter Memorandum of Under-
standing] (noted in Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2243 and Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 595).
112 Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 595 (quoting Memorandum of Understanding)
(alterations in original).
"3 See id. (referring to Lithuania's 'Law Concerning Responsibility for Genocide
of the People of Lithuania," for which there is no statute of limitations, and Israel's
'Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law," which applies extraterritorially
and imposes the death penalty). Although the Court did not mention it, it is worth
noting that the United States has a statute criminalizing genocide. See 18 U.S.C. §
1091(a) (1994), which states:
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under statutes of both nations in response to OSrs questions."4
In considering the possibility of "cooperative international-
ism," the majority in Balsys admitted it might be persuaded if
the collaborating countries had "enacted substantially similar
criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of international
character, and if ... the United States was granting immunity
from domestic prosecution for the purpose of obtaining evidence
to be delivered to other nations as prosecutors of a crime com-
mon to both countries.""' Likewise, the majority conceded the
outcome could be different upon a showing that "one nation [was]
the agent of the other.""6
While the cooperation between OSI and the nations of
Lithuania and Israel may not have reached the formal level pre-
scribed by the Court, it appears as if all the required elements
are present. The United States has an interest in seeing Balsys
prosecuted."7 There can be little doubt that OSI's primary pur-
... Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war, in a circumstance
described in subsection (d) and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole
or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as
such-
(1) kills members of that group;
(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;
(3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members
of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques;
(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the
physical destruction of the group in whole or in part;
(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
(6) transfers by force children of the group to another group;
or attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
Further, Balsys's alleged war-time activity was the basis of the deportation action
under § 1182. See supra note 19 (outlining statutory basis for deporting Balsys).
"4 See Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 594-95.
"" Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2235.
116 Id. The Court did not explain what would constitute an agency relationship.
In Gecas, however, the Eleventh Circuit described actions that would not constitute
agency. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997). Guatema-
lan officers were not agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency when they
stopped and searched a boat after a tip from a DEA agent. See id. (citing United
States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 511 (11th Cir. 1994)). Similarly, Mexican police were
not agents of the United States when they arrested defendants after receiving in-
formation from American police officers. Id (citing Birdsell v. United States, 346
F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 1965)). The relationship between the United States and
Lithuania and Israel clearly came closer to forming an agency relationship than the
two examples provided by the court in Gecas.
"7 During the argument before the Supreme Court, the United States said it
"[clertainly" had an interest in seeing Balsys "prosecuted elsewhere." Later in the
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tended to Balsys."
III. EXTENDING THE PRIVILEGE WOULD NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
HARM U.S. INTERESTS
Before invoking the privilege, a witness must demonstrate
that he is "confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely
trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." The district
court considered whether Balsys faced current or possible future
foreign prosecution; whether his testimony would have furthered
such prosecution; and the possibility that the testimony would be
shared with other governments." It found that Balsys in fact
faced a "real and substantial" fear of foreign prosecution.' Bal-
'2 See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 1997).
121 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). See Zicarelli v. New Jer-
sey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972) (stating reasonable fear
is based on the possibility prospect of penal liability that is real and substantial and
not merely "remote and speculative possibilities").
22 See United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting
In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982)).
'23Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 597. The court stated it would have to review rele-
vant foreign statutes to determine if Balsys's fear of foreign prosecution was rea-
sonable. See id. at 592-93. The court first examined Lithuania's criminal statute
"punishing Nazis and Nazi collaborators for crimes committed against the Lithua-
nian people during World War H." Id. at 593. The statute is retroactive, does not
have a statute of limitations, and provides for punishment as harsh as the death
penalty. See id. at 593-94. Further, Lithuania formed a commission in 1992 to in-
vestigate crimes against its people during World War II. See id. at 594. The com-
mission authorized the Lithuanian government to "enter into agreements with the
United States, Israel and other states 'for judicial assistance in cases involving the
investigation of crimes of genocide.' " Id. The court easily concluded that Balsys
faced a true threat in Lithuania. See id. The court next reviewed the possibility of a
prosecution in Germany. See id. Although Germany has a murder law and has
prosecuted people suspected of "crimes against Jewish people under this statute," it
was not clear to the court that Balsys, a non-German, could be prosecuted. Id
Third, the court looked at the threat facing Balsys from Israel. See id. Israel has a
"Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, [which] applies extraterritorially
and imposes the death penalty" in certain situations. Id. As a result, the court con-
cluded Balsys could incriminate himself under Israeli law. See id. at 594-95.
Next the court had to determine the likelihood that the information gathered by
OSI would be shared with Lithuania and Israel. See id at 595. In light of OSrs
mandate and the Memorandum of Understanding between Lithuania and the
United States to share information about suspected war criminals, the court con-
cluded the evidence would be shared with Lithuania. See id. at 595-96. Further, al-
though OSI and Israel did not have a specific agreement, OSI has shared informa-
tion about suspected war criminals with Israel in the past. See id. at 596 (referring
to evidence gathered on Demjanjuk, whose case is discussed in supra note 73). The
court concluded, therefore, that "OSI would in all probability disclose Balsys's tes-
timony to Israel." Id.
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sys was the exception, however.an In the past, most witnesses
have been unable to pass the real and substantial fear test.' If
the privilege were available to Balsys and those similarly situ-
ated, most witnesses still would not overcome the hurdle, and
"the class of witnesses who are likely to be eligible for the privi-
lege [would remain] ... very limited." 2' Indeed, Balsys most
likely overcame the hurdle primarily because of the particularly
strong international collaboration against him."7
The majority in Balsys expressed concern regarding the ef-
fect on domestic law enforcement efforts if the privilege did in-
clude foreign prosecutions.' Yet, "a constitutional privilege does
Finally, the court considered the possibility of Balsys being extradited from the
United States to a country interested in prosecuting him, and found that "Balsys
face[d] a 'real and substantial' danger of prosecution by Lithuania and Israel." Id. at
597. The court reasoned that Balsys was subject to deportation because of his al-
leged war crimes. See idi. His deportation would be considered "de facto extradition."
Md at 596. Balsys's right to choose which country he would be sent to would be sub-
ject to the discretion of the Attorney General. See id. Even if the Attorney General
approved a country other than Lithuania, that country could reject Balsys because
of his suspected war-time activities. See id. Thus rejected, Balsys would be sent to
the country in which he is a citizen-Lithuania. See id.
124 See United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2244 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (stating the "'foreign application' of the privilege would matter only in a case
where an individual could not be prosecuted domestically but the threat of foreign
prosecution is substantial"); United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir.
1997) (noting the issue of applying the privilege to foreign prosecutions seldom
arises because of the difficulty of demonstrating a real and substantial fear of such
prosecution).
1'2 See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478
(1972) (stating that it was unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the privi-
lege extends to fear of foreign prosecution because the witness did not face a real
and substantial threat of such prosecution); Balsys, 119 F.3d at 135 (noting the
relatively few instances in which witnesses have managed to prove the required
threat of foreign prosecution and the numerous cases in which the witness is unable
to meet the standard); In re Grand Jury Witness Gilboe, 699 F.2d 71,78 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding it unnecessary to resolve the privilege issue because the witness's
"fear of foreign prosecution was at best speculative and remote"); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena of Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding the same). But see
Rotsztain, supra note 5, at 1966-68 (discussing the inadequacy of the substantial
fear test and arguing that unfamiliarity and occasional inability to determine appli-
cable foreign law produces unpredictable results).
12 Balsys, 119 F.3d at 135 (noting that only aliens are deportable and not every
witness is an alien).
127 See supra note 123 (reviewing the district court's finding that Balsys faced a
real and substantial fear and demonstrating that the fear was real because of OSI's
overall mandate and the United States' particular agreement with Lithuania).
123 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Fear of Foreign
Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1304, 1304 (1973) (noting
the Fifth Amendment had been criticized as "an impediment to effective law en-
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not disappear, nor even lose its normal vitality, simply because
its use may hinder law enforcement activities. That is a conse-
quence.., that was originally and ever since deemed justified by
the need to protect individual rights." " In the rare case in
which the requisite fear is demonstrated, permitting the witness
to use the privilege would not substantially deter law enforce-
ment efforts.30 First, a witness is not allowed "to maintain a
general silence."'3 ' Moreover, a witness is only entitled to invoke
the privilege when his responses "would in themselves support a
conviction [or] ... furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute the claimant for a... crime."3 2 Perhaps most im-
portant for the United States' interests in Balsys's situation, "an
adverse inference may be drawn in civil cases when a witness
invokes the privilege."'33 As a deportation hearing is a civil mat-
ter, a resident alien who invokes the privilege "takes a chance
that he will create a negative inference that may be used in
conjunction with other evidence to deport him.""= Thus, if Balsys
were allowed to use the privilege in this situation, the govern-
forcement").
'9 In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972).
'0 See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136. "[Plermitting the privilege in such cases need
not hamper the legitimate goals of the United States to a significantly greater de-
gree than does invocation of the privilege in the face of domestic prosecution...."
Id. at 124. A commentator recently suggested that the limitation of the privilege will
probably not even produce the desired testimony. See Recent Case, Criminal Proce-
dure-Fifth Amendment-Eleventh Circuit Holds that the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination Does Not Apply to the Possibility of Foreign Prosecution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1128, 1132 (1998) (suggesting a witness facing foreign prosecution might
choose to be in contempt of an American court rather than incriminate himself). But
see United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 599-600 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("A contrary
decision by this Court would allow individuals attempting to immigrate to the
United States to misrepresent their personal histories and other relevant informa-
tion in order to gain access to this country, leaving the government without recourse
and seriously eroding domestic law enforcement.").
13 Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136; see United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2245
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "the witness would not be entitled to
claim a general silence").
132 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
"9 Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136; see also Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2245 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (highlighting same point). Both cases cite to Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308 (1976), in which the Supreme Court stated "that the Fifth Amendment does not
forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify
in response to probative evidence offered against them." Id. at 318 (emphasis
added). " Tis is so, even though, as in Baxter, the government is a party to the ac-
tion and would benefit from the drawing of the inference.' " Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136
(citations omitted).
'4 Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136.
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ment's purpose of deporting an alleged war criminal could still
be served "as long as there was independent evidence to support
the negative inferences beyond the invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination."" Further, nothing would prevent
OSI from sharing its non-compelled testimony with foreign na-
tions.
CONCLUSION
In holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause is not avail-
able to a witness fearing foreign prosecution, the Supreme Court
disregarded the policies underlying the Fifth Amendment, the
precedent interpreting the privilege, the practical realities of
modern day international law enforcement, and exaggerated the
domestic costs of extending the privilege in certain situations.
Further, although the Court paid lip service to international co-
operation in law enforcement, it refused to recognize the exten-
sive role OSI would play in the foreign prosecution of Balsys.
Moreover, domestic interests would not be intolerably harmed by
extension of the privilege-Balsys could still be deported and
OSI could still share its evidence with other nations. The privi-
lege ought to be applied to prevent government abuse in the rare
situations where the witness can demonstrate a real and sub-
stantial threat of foreign prosecution and that the United States
will play a significant role in not only the investigation of the
crime but also the prosecution of the case.
Erin Kelly Regan
'S3 United States v. Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 311 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1847 (1997). Stelmokas concerned a denaturalization proceeding against
an alleged Nazi collaborator. See id. In fact, Balsys eventually chose to leave the
United States and return to Lithuania "rather than testify about his World War H
activities." Suspected Collaborator With Nazis Leaves U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1999, at A 10.
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